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cut research jobs along with sales 
positions and spending $68 bil-
lion to purchase Wyeth in a bid to 
strengthen its product portfolio. 
Its troubles are not recent, and 
when it announced last Septem-
ber that it was getting out of the 
business of developing new drugs 
to prevent or treat cardiovascular 
disease,1 the news did not come 
as a complete surprise. The mar-
ket for cardiovascular drugs was 
crowded, and Pfizer’s recent ef-
forts in the area had faltered: less 
than a year earlier, late clinical 
testing suggested that torcetrapib, 
a drug designed to increase levels 
of high-density lipoprotein cho-
lesterol  that  had  been  Pfizer’s 
greatest hope for replacing Lipitor 
(atorvastatin)  as  a  blockbuster 
product, increased mortality. Nev-
ertheless, because Pfizer had pros-
pered on the strong performance 
of  its  cardiovascular  drugs  — 
with nearly $13 billion in sales 
in 2007, Lipitor was the world’s 
top-selling drug — the announce-
ment repudiated a strategy that 
had been spectacularly successful 
for years. Did the decision reflect 
only the strengths and weakness-
es of Pfizer’s pipeline, or have the 
commercial prospects soured so 
much that we can expect an indus-
trywide decline in innovation in 
cardiovascular drugs?
Certainly the need for better 
ways to prevent and treat cardio-
vascular disease has not disap-
peared.  Although  age-adjusted 
death rates from heart and cere-
brovascular disease continued to 
decline at least through 2005, heart 
disease remains the most com-
mon cause of death in the United 
States.2 Aging of the populations 
of wealthy countries and the in-
creasing prevalence of obesity and 
type 2 diabetes mellitus, along 
with rising incomes in much of 
the developing world, mean that 
the population at high risk for car-
diovascular  disease  will  expand 
worldwide in the coming years. 
Thus, despite the vagaries of the 
economy and gaps in health in-
surance coverage, the demand for 
cardiovascular drugs is not likely 
to collapse anytime soon.
Commercial success, however, 
depends on more than the num-
ber of patients who might benefit 
from treatment. With the grow-
ing acceptance of comparative ef-
fectiveness  research,  there  are 
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pany. Its stock price has fallen as it has struggled 
to boost research productivity, going so far as to 
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strong pressures to compare new 
cardiovascular drugs to generic 
versions of effective drugs — such 
as high-potency statins — rather 
than to placebo. Generic statins 
have  been  on  the  market  long 
enough to establish strong safe-
ty records and to produce myriad 
studies demonstrating that they 
prevent  heart  disease.  Without 
proof of superior safety or effec-
tiveness, an expensive new drug 
may not sell well. Furthermore, 
cholesterol reduction is only one 
of several potential strategies for 
preventing cardiovascular disease. 
Antihypertensive agents and as-
pirin confer additional protection. 
A  “polypill”  composed  of  low 
doses of well-tolerated, inexpen-
sive drugs could reduce the rela-
tive risk of cardiovascular disease 
by as much as 80% and would be 
inexpensive and safe enough to be 
adopted with limited monitoring.3 
Demonstrating that the addition 
of a new drug to any well-designed 
regimen  for  the  prevention  of 
heart disease improves health out-
comes — even if the regimen con-
sists only of generic drugs — will 
be far more difficult than demon-
strating superiority over placebo.
Safety standards are also likely 
to  grow  more  stringent  in  the 
coming  years.  The  Food  and 
Drug Administration (FDA) takes 
a particularly hard look at drugs 
for conditions for which we al-
ready have safe and effective treat-
ments, particularly if the incre-
mental benefits appear to be small. 
The FDA is likely to scrutinize even 
more closely any drug for use by 
patients who can expect only small 
near-term benefits, such as young 
adults with few cardiac risk fac-
tors. If, instead, companies restrict 
testing to the populations most 
likely to benefit, such as people 
identified by genomic testing as 
appropriate candidates for treat-
ment or patients with known cor-
onary disease, they may need to 
limit marketing to narrowly tar-
geted populations.
Pfizer announced that it was 
not cutting back its research in 
other areas that it sees as more 
promising, such as Alzheimer’s 
disease and cancer. In the case of 
Alzheimer’s disease, a new drug 
would enter a market that offers 
few alternative treatments, none 
of which are fully satisfactory. And 
of the many treatments available 
for common cancers, none are cu-
rative and few have long-term ef-
ficacy. In either case, demand for 
an effective new product is likely 
to be less sensitive to price than 
is demand for drugs that prevent 
cardiovascular disease. Further-
more, safety standards are gener-
ally less rigorous for treatments 
for  devastating  conditions  that 
have no effective treatment and 
for life-threatening illnesses. A re-
direction of drug-development ac-
tivities is thus an appropriate re-
sponse to anticipated changes in 
both  the  drug-approval  process 
and the market for new drugs.
Pfizer’s  decision  was  un-
doubtedly  driven  by  an  assess-
ment  of  its  drug  pipeline  and 
may not portend an industrywide 
shift  away  from  cardiovascular 
drugs.  Indeed,  according  to  a 
recent report from the Pharma-
ceutical Research and Manufac-
turers of America (PhRMA), 312 
medications for heart disease and 
stroke are currently under devel-
opment (see graph).4 And Pfizer 
has already been shifting its fo-
cus to other areas; recent acqui-
sitions and development partner-
ships  had  undoubtedly  led  the 
manufacturer to believe that its 
Alzheimer’s treatments were es-
pecially promising. Of course, such 
a strategy carries substantial risk. 
The inadequacy of existing treat-
ments for Alzheimer’s disease is 
a sign of the difficulty of the sci-
entific and clinical challenges. And 
An Uncertain Future for Cardiovascular Drug Development?
2 col
21
5
2
20
18
11
16
16
33
36
10
18
26
27
22
40
39
AUTHOR:
FIGURE
JOB: ISSUE:
4-C
H/T
RETAKE 1st
2nd
SIZE
ICM
CASE
EMail Line
H/T
Combo
Revised
AUTHOR, PLEASE NOTE:
Figure has been redrawn and type has been reset.
Please check carefully.
REG F
3rd
Enon
ARTIST:
Garber
1 of 1
03-19-09
ts
36012
Acute Coronary Syndrome
Adjunctive Therapies
Angina
Arrhythmia or Atrial Fibrillation
Atherosclerosis
Coronary Artery Disease
Heart Attack
Heart Failure
Hypertension
Imaging Agents
Ischemic Disorders
Lipid Disorders
Peripheral Vascular Disease
Pulmonary Vascular Disease
Stroke
Thrombosis
Other
Medicines in Development for Heart Disease and Stroke.
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The New England Journal of Medicine 
Downloaded from nejm.org at HARVARD UNIVERSITY on December 16, 2013. For personal use only. No other uses without permission. 
 Copyright © 2009 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved. n engl j med 360;12  nejm.org  march 19, 2009
PERSPECTIVE
1171
there are already many profitable 
markets within oncology, so suc-
cess in this crowded area is far 
less likely to be driven by the dis-
covery of an overlooked market 
than by a scientific breakthrough 
that leads to a substantially bet-
ter product.
In these uncertain times, Pfiz-
er’s decision is a reminder that 
pharmaceutical innovation is vul-
nerable to market forces, changes 
in medical practice, and regulato-
ry requirements. Efforts to bring 
health care costs under control 
and to rationalize health care de-
livery challenge the pharmaceu-
tical industry. The greater price 
sensitivity of purchasers of drugs 
is both inevitable and necessary 
but means that the price premium 
for new drugs may be smaller than 
in the past. And drugs that pro-
duce only small incremental ben-
efits over highly effective, low-cost 
alternatives are unlikely to com-
mand high prices or offer a fa-
vorable return on investment. If 
pharmaceutical firms are required 
to show that their new products 
are better than existing products 
rather than just placebo, they will 
need to conduct comparative tri-
als that are much larger and more 
expensive than traditional phase 
3 trials.
These shifts in the ways that 
pharmaceuticals are evaluated and 
purchased can ultimately improve 
the efficiency of health care. But 
their effects on pharmaceutical 
innovation may be compounded 
by increasing regulatory burdens, 
as the FDA comes under intense 
pressure to raise preapproval safe-
ty standards. The pressure is a di-
rect result of controversies over 
such widely used drugs as Avandia 
(rosiglitazone)  and  Vioxx  (rofe-
coxib), which have led the press, 
government agencies, and Con-
gress to question the transparency 
and completeness of safety report-
ing, as well as the effectiveness of 
the FDA’s oversight.5 The peren-
nial questions about balancing the 
risk that an unsafe product will 
be inappropriately approved for 
marketing against the possibility 
that an effective product will be 
delayed or never reach the market 
are, if anything, more relevant to-
day than ever.
We need to know more about 
the  safety  and  effectiveness  of 
pharmaceutical products, yet sim-
ply demanding larger quantities 
of traditional preapproval safety 
information  will  raise  the  cost 
of  bringing  a  drug  to  market, 
while doing little to prevent safe-
ty problems that become appar-
ent only when large numbers of 
patients use the drug in routine 
clinical settings. The commitment, 
in the recently passed stimulus 
bill,  to  the  wider  adoption  of 
health care information technol-
ogy and to comparative effective-
ness research means that it may 
soon be possible to do a much 
better  job  of  monitoring  phar-
maceutical safety and effective-
ness after FDA approval. Ideally, 
this will make it possible to de-
tect safety problems more reliably. 
A regulatory policy more closely 
aligned with improving postmar-
keting  surveillance  capabilities 
might  not  have  deterred  Pfizer 
from abandoning the development 
of new cardiovascular drugs, but 
it offers the best hope of ensur-
ing that pharmaceutical innova-
tion will continue without com-
promising safety.
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